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1 Introduction
In recent years there has been published articles focusing on capital structure in con-
tinuous time modeling. These articles have been focusing on various issues that arrises
when optimizing the capital structure in a firm. To some extent new issues arrises as the
articles focuses on solving other issues. These articles can be separated into two main
categories. Static models and dynamic models. The difference is whether the capital
structure is optimized once or if it is continuously optimized as time goes by.
All these models have to some degree been compared to the static capital structure
model presented in Leland (1994). This model has some really nice interpretations which
makes it easy to understand and use the closed form solutions found within the model.
Still it addresses many of the different issues that arrises when dealing with these type
of models. However, this model has some rather strong limitations. First of all, it is
only a static model. Leverage is optimized initially and debt is not restructured as time
goes by. Second, this model does not differentiate between bankruptcy and liquidation.
Here bankruptcy refers to what is known as bankruptcy according to chapter 11, where a
debtor stops paying the creditor the agreed combination of interest and down payment.
Liquidation refers to what is known as bankruptcy according to chapter 7, where there
is a change of ownership and control over the debtors assets. For this thesis, the assets is
the firm itself. When Leland (1994) does not allow for this differentiation, value might be
destroyed, and firms that are profitable in the long run might be sold off and terminated.
A second problem is the social aspect that arrises when firms are liquidated in terms of
people loosing their jobs.
Hart (2000) addressed the need for some goals in setting up a good bankruptcy pro-
cedure. He identified three goals that should be satisfied when setting up a bankruptcy
procedure. Broadie, Chernov, and Sundaresan (2007) used these goals in their article
when they expanded the results of Leland (1994), where they separated bankruptcy and
liquidation. Checking the solutions provided by these two models, Leland (1994) gives
closed form solutions, while Broadie et al. (2007) needs to be solved numerically. The
difficult methodology used for solving the latter model alongside with the model being a
static model the largest limitations of this model.
The goals for this thesis is therefore to use the economic framework built in Broadie
et al. (2007) to modify Leland (1994), but keep the solutions on closed form in contrast
to Broadie et al. (2007). The reason for this is that closed form solutions are easier both
to understand and to use. This thesis will therefore also focus on explaining the model
intuitively as it is developed. In order to keep the model as simple as possible and to be
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able to find closed form valuations of claim in the firm, all cash flows will be modeled as
perpetual annuities. The main goal will be to set the liquidation and bankruptcy barrier
in such a way that the goals provided in Hart (2000) are satisfied and the results from
Leland (1994) is closer linked to the observations found in the real world.
Section 2 will set up the model from Leland (1994). The model will be slightly changed
such that the underlying value process is the earnings in the firm contrary to the value
of the activities used originally. The modified model will be presented thoroughly. This
is due to the modified Leland (1994) model will be used as a benchmark model for the
new model that will be developed in sections 4 and 5. Therefore is is necessary to give
the reader a good understanding of the benchmark model, and hopefully the intuitive
explanations of the new model will become clearer.
The next section, section 3, will set up the necessary results provided by Mjøs and
Persson (2008) and Mjøs, Persson, and Huang (2008). These results will be treated as pure
mathematical formulas, hence there will not be a discussion whether these results hold.
The results are based on the exact same underlying value process as will be presented in
section 2.1, and they are applicable to the world described in Broadie et al. (2007).
In section 4 the basics in the new model will be presented. Troublesome issues will
be highlighted, and possible solutions will be discussed. The main focus for this section
will be to check if the economical framework from Broadie et al. (2007) can be applied
to Leland (1994) by using the annuities from Mjøs and Persson (2008).
Section 5 will fully derive the new model and thoroughly present some comparative
statics. The results will be explained and compared to the Leland (1994) model. The
model will be based upon the economic framework set up in Broadie et al. (2007) and it
will be coherent with the goal identified in Hart (2000).
Finally, section 6 will add some closing remarks about the model developed and how
it perform compared to the Leland (1994) model.
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2 Modified Leland (1994)
Starting off, this section will introduce the economical framework set up in Leland (1994).
Leland’s original model will be slightly changed such that the underlying value process
is an EBIT stream generated by the firm assets, instead of the value of the firm’s activ-
ities. This EBIT stream, which is following a standard stochastic process, was used in
Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001).
2.1 The Value Process
In Goldstein et al. (2001) the authors assume that the firm’s assets generate an EBIT
cash flow denoted δt, given by the stochastic process
dδt = µδtdt+ σδtdWt. (2.1)
Here, the drift and the volatility, denoted µ and σ respectively, are constants, and δ0 is
the fixed initial cash flow level.
The time t market value, denoted Vt, of the assumed perpetual EBIT stream from
the assets equals
Vt = E
Q
t
[∫ ∞
0
e−r(s−t)δsds
]
=
δt
r − µ. (2.2)
Hence, if we substitute the market value Vt from equation (2.2) into equation (2.1),
the market value, Vt, is given by the stochastic process
dVt = (rVt − δt)dt+ σVtdWt
= µVtdt+ σVtdWt.
(2.3)
A claim on the firm’s EBIT stream as a function of V and t, denoted F (V, t), continu-
ously pays a non-negative coupon, c, as long as the firm is solvent. According to Merton
(1974), F (V, t) must therefore satisfy the fundamental partial differential equation
1
2
σ2V 2FV V (V, t) + µV FV (V, t) + Ft(V, t)− rF (V, t) + c = 0. (2.4)
This equation has, in general, no closed form solution. However, a closed form solu-
tion can be found by considering perpetual claims to the EBIT stream. Then the term
F (V, t) = 0, and equation (2.4) is changed to the ordinary differential equation
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) + µV F ′(V )− rF (V ) + c = 0. (2.5)
In order to solve this equation, we first consider the homogenous part
1
2
σ2V 2F ′′(V ) + µV F ′(V )− rF (V ) = 0. (2.6)
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By inserting F (V ) = V X into equation (2.6), we get
1
2
σ2V 2X(X − 1)V X−2 + µV XV X−1 − rV X = 0. (2.7)
Assume V is always positive, hence V X is also always positive. Then we can divide
by V X , and we are left with
1
2
σ2X(X − 1) + µX − r = 0. (2.8)
Solving for X, we get the solutions x1 = α and x2 = −β
α =
1
2
σ2 − µ+
√
(1
2
σ2 − µ)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
, (2.9)
and
β =
µ− 1
2
σ2 +
√
(1
2
σ2 − µ)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
. (2.10)
Here α and β satisfies the inequalities α > 1 and β > 0.
The general solution of the homogenous part of equation (2.5) is therefore
FH(V ) = K1V
α +K2V
−β, (2.11)
and the corresponding general solution of equation (2.5) is
F (V ) = K0 +K1V
α +K2V
−β, (2.12)
where K0, K1, and K2 are some constants.
2.2 Value of Debt
The firm, with an EBIT stream as described above, adds debt to its capital structure.
The debt promises a perpetual coupon payment, c, and the value of this perpetual claim
is denoted D(V ). The coupon remains constant, as long as the firm is solvent. In this
model bankruptcy and liquidation are not separated, in other words they happen at the
exact same time. Let VB denote the level where bankruptcy is declared. This happens
when the firm stop paying coupons. In bankruptcy, a fraction 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 of the value,
V , will be lost in bankruptcy costs. The creditors are then left with (1− λ)VB while the
share holders get nothing.
Searching for boundary conditions, the value of debt must satisfy the following con-
ditions:
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D(V ) = (1− λ)VB, when V = VB, (2.13)
and
D(V )→ c
r
, as V →∞. (2.14)
The first condition says that the value of debt is equal to the remaining value of the firm
after bankruptcy costs at bankruptcy. The second condition says that when V gets very
high, the value of debt converges to the value of risk free debt. The reason for this is
that the probability of default goes towards zero as V goes to infinity.
Applying these boundary conditions to the general solution found in equation (2.12),
one can find the constants K0, K1, and K2. Applying equation (2.14) to equation (2.12),
gives K1 = 0. This is to keep the value of debt from increasing exponentially as V
increases. Also, K0 can be found by observing that as V → ∞, V −β → 0, hence
K0 =
c
r
. Finally, applying equation (2.13) to equation (2.12), K2 is found to be K2 =[
(1− λ)VB − cr
]
V βB . The value of debt is therefore given by
D(V ) =
c
r
+
[
(1− λ)VB − c
r
] [ V
VB
]−β
. (2.15)
D(V ) is increasing in the parameters c and V , and decreasing in the parameters r, λ,
and VB.
This expression has some useful interpretations. The first term is the value of risk free
debt. The second term has two parts. The first part explains what happens at bankruptcy.
There the creditor lose the value of the risk free debt and gain the liquidation value of the
firm after bankruptcy costs. The second part can be interpreted as the price of a claim,
denoted Ua, which pays 1 the first time V hits the bankruptcy barrier VB from above.
Ua =
[
V
VB
]−β
. (2.16)
Instead of continuing to use the rather tedious procedure described to derive the value
of debt, equation (2.16) can be used to value claims directly. This is done by reducing
the value of a riskless perpetual annuity by what is lost in case of bankruptcy multiplied
by the price of the claim which pays 1 in the case of bankruptcy. This is exemplified in
the interpretation of the value of debt. Going forward, this is the method that will be
used to value the various claims on the firm.
The debt in place has two implications for the total value of the firm. First, it reduces
value due to possible losses in case of bankruptcy. Second, it increases value due to the
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tax deductibility of interest payments. Therefore, value of these claims needs to be found,
before the value of the firm and the value of the equity can be derived.
2.3 Value of Bankruptcy Costs
If bankruptcy occurs, a fraction λ of VB is lost in bankruptcy costs. The value of this
claim can be found directly by multiplying the bankruptcy costs with the price of default,
given in equation (2.16). The value of bankruptcy costs is therefore given by
BC(V ) = λVB
[
V
VB
]−β
. (2.17)
BC(V ) is increasing in the parameters λ and VB, and decreasing in the parameter V .
2.4 Value of Tax Benefits
Similar as for the value of bankruptcy costs, the value of tax benefits can be derived by
using equation (2.16). As long as the firm pays coupons, it can deduct these by the tax
rate, denoted τ . The value of these tax deductions can therefore be found by getting the
tax deduction as a perpetual claim, less the value of this claim stopping when the firm
declares bankruptcy. The value of the tax benefits is therefore given by
TB(V ) =
τc
r
[
1−
(
V
VB
)−β]
. (2.18)
TB(V ) is increasing in the parameters τ , c, and V , and decreasing in the parameters r
and VB.
2.5 Value of Firm
The total value of the firm, denoted v(V ), reflects three aspects; the firm’s EBIT stream,
the bankruptcy costs, and the tax benefits. The value of the firm is therefore given by
v(V ) = V + TB(V )−BC(V )
= V +
τc
r
[
1−
(
V
VB
)−β]
− λVB
[
V
VB
]−β
.
(2.19)
v(V ) is increasing in the parameters V , τ , and c, and decreasing in the parameters r and
VB.
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2.6 Value of Equity
The value of the equity in the firm, denoted E(V ), is the residual claim, after all other
stake holders are paid. Hence, the value of equity is given by
E(V ) = v(V )−D(V )
= V − (1− τ)c
r
+
[
(1− τ)c
r
− VB
] [
V
VB
]−β
.
(2.20)
E(V ) is increasing in the parameters V and τ , and decreasing in the parameters c and
VB. The bankruptcy barrier, VB, increases E(V ) up to a certain point, before it starts to
decrease E(V ). The share holders objective is always to maximize their value of equity.
It will now be interesting to check if VB can be determined endogenously by the share
holders.
2.7 Endogenous Bankruptcy Barrier VB
If the barrier for bankruptcy, VB, can be determined by the share holders in the firm, they
will maximize their value of equity with respect to VB. This is done by differentiating
equation (2.20) with respect to VB, setting the derivative equal to zero, and solving for
VB. The barrier for bankruptcy is then given by
VB =
(1− τ)c
r
β
β + 1
. (2.21)
VB is increasing in the parameters c and β, and decreasing in the parameters τ and r.
Substituting the expression for VB into the equations for value of debt (2.15), value
of firm (2.19), and value of equity (2.20) gives
D(V ) =
c
r
[
1−
( c
V
)β
k
]
, (2.22)
v(V ) = V +
τc
r
[
1−
( c
V
)β
h
]
, (2.23)
and
E(V ) = V − (1− τ)c
r
[
1−
( c
V
)β
m
]
. (2.24)
where
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m =
[
(1− τ)β
r(β + 1)
]β
1
β + 1
h =
[
(β + 1) +
λ(1− τ)β
τ
]
m
k = [(β + 1)− (1− λ)(1− τ)β]m.
The results from this modified version of Leland (1994) are the exact same results as
in the original Leland (1994). The only difference is found in the expression for β. This
is because we allow for r 6= µ and that the underlying value process is changed from the
value of the firm’s activities to an EBIT stream.
2.8 Comparative Statics
Here, a numerical example will be presented to find optimal capital structure in the firm,
and to check how this affects various claims on the firm’s cash flow.
The parameters will be set according to Leland (1994), to make comparison between
the original and the modified version as simple as possible. The parameters will therefore
have the values; µ = 3.5%, σ = 20%, r = 6%, λ = 50%, τ = 35%, c = 6, and V = 100.
Figure 1 illustrates how all the claims on the firm’s EBIT stream changes as the
coupon changes. Value of debt, tax benefits, and firm all got local maxima for different
values of the coupon. The value of bankruptcy cost is strictly increasing in the coupon
and the value of equity is strictly decreasing in the coupon. To really understand how
these claims behave, it is necessary to take a closer look at some comparative statics
where some of the parameters are changed.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect on the value of debt of changing the volatility. Maximiz-
ing the value of debt with a high volatility gives a higher optimal coupon than maximizing
the value of debt with a lower volatility. Also, the effect of changing volatility is a change
in the curvature where high volatility gives a flatter curve than low volatility.
Figure 3 illustrates the effect on the firm value of changing the volatility. Maximizing
the value of the firm gives different optimal coupon levels depending on the underlying
volatility for the firm’s EBIT stream. For all illustrated volatilities the optimal coupon
is within the range of 6 and 7. If the firm’s EBIT stream has a high volatility, a higher
coupon is needed in order to maximize the value of the firm than if the firm’s EBIT
stream has a low volatility. Just from looking at this figure, one can conclude that the
value of an unlevered firm can increase by about 20% to 30%, depending on the volatility,
by adding debt to the capital structure.
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Figure 1: The effect of the coupon on the various claims on the firm.
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Figure 2: The effect of volatility on the value of debt.
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Figure 3: The effect of volatility on the value of the firm.
Figure 4 shows how the value of the firm change as the leverage change. Leverage is
found by dividing the value of debt by the value of the firm. Contrary to figure 3 where
the value of the firm is maximized at the coupon level, this figure gives higher values
for the value of the firm with low volatility at any fixed level of leverage comparing to a
higher volatility.
Finally, figure 5 shows how the value of equity changes as the coupon changes. The
value of equity is decreasing in the coupon. On the other hand, it is increasing in the
volatility. These two properties are the same properties as for a call option, where the
value is decreasing in the strike price and increasing in the volatility. Also, since equity
is the residual claim on the firm’s EBIT stream, equity in fact can be considered as a call
option on the firm’s EBIT.
As shown in the above, the Leland (1994) model is a static capital structure model
which optimizes when the equity holders should stop paying coupons and declare bankruptcy.
The limitations of this model is that it only optimizes the capital structure once, and
that it does not allow for debt restructuring or refinancing. One can also argue that the
tax benefits might be inaccurate. This is because the firm only get a tax benefit if the
firm is in a taxable position. But this might not be the case. If the firm is not able to
get all the tax benefits, the optimal capital structure will obviously be set differently.
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Figure 4: The effect of volatility on leverage in the firm.
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Figure 5: The effect of volatility on the value of equity.
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3 Economical Framework
In order to set up a new static capital structure model, the economical framework set up
in Broadie et al. (2007) will be used. In addition to the barrier in Leland (1994), a new
barrier will now be introduced. The new barrier will be a bankruptcy barrier according
to chapter 11. According to the US bankruptcy code, a firm that is not able to pay
their debt can file for bankruptcy protection according to chapter 11 in order to escape
liquidation. Liquidation is the form of default used in Leland (1994). The bankruptcy
barrier will allow for the equity holders to restructure their debt and a grace period where
the debt holders are not able to liquidate the firm.
In order to develop the new model in sections 4 and 5, results from Mjøs and Persson
(2008) and Mjøs et al. (2008) will be used. These results gives closed form solutions to
claims on the firm’s cash flow in presence of bankruptcy and liquidation. Also, these
expressions uses the same underlying value process as stated in section 2.1, hence these
expressions can be implemented without any modifications.
3.1 The Risk of Lost Debt Coupons
In their first article, Mjøs and Persson (2008), the authors provide closed form solutions
for claims on the firm’s cash flow which are fixed coupon payments. The results are
divided into two different sets of solutions. The first set, where a coupon is paid only
when the value process, now denoted A, is above the barrier for bankruptcy, denoted AB.
This will be referred to as an above annuity and denoted by subscript A. The second set
pays a coupon only when the value process is between the barrier for bankruptcy and
the barrier for liquidation, denoted AL. This claim is referred to as a below annuity and
denoted by subscript B. Also, superscript a and b denotes whether the initial value, A0,
is starting above or below the barrier, respectively. All claims are perpetual claims.
Similar, as in equation (2.16), the price of a claim, denoted Ua, which pays 1 the first
time A hits a barrier B from above, is given by
Ua =
[
A
B
]−β
. (3.1)
The price of a claim, denoted U b, which pays 1 the first time A hit a barrier B from
below, is given by
U b =
[
A
B
]α
. (3.2)
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Going forward, these two expressions will be used for both the price of 1 upon bankruptcy
and liquidation. To find the values upon bankruptcy, AB is substituted in for B. And
equivalently, AL is substituted in for B in order to find the price of 1 upon liquidation.
The value of an above annuity, V aA(A), when A ≥ AB, is given by
V aA(A) =
c
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α)(
A
AL
)−β]
. (3.3)
This value is not as intuitive as the annuities in Leland (1994). Here it consist of a risk
free perpetual coupon, less a term modeling that the coupon only is paid when A ≥ AB
multiplied by the price of 1 upon liquidation.
The value of an above annuity, V bA(A), when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
V bA(A) =
c
r
β
α + β
[(
A
AB
)α
−
(
AL
AB
)α(
A
AL
)−β]
. (3.4)
The interpretation here is similar as for equation (3.3). Perpetual coupon payments if
A ≥ AB, less the value of losing this possibility if the firm is liquidated.
The value of a below annuity, V aB(A), when A ≥ AB, is given by
V aB(A) =
c
r
[
α
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α
− 1
][
A
AL
]−β
. (3.5)
The value here is gained by coupon payments only when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, less the value of
losing these coupons if the firm is liquidated.
The value of a below annuity, V bB(A), when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
V bB(A) =
c
r
[
1− β
α + β
(
A
AB
)α
−
(
1− β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α)(
A
AL
)−β]
. (3.6)
As for equation (3.5), V bB(A) gives the value of coupons paid only when AL ≤ A ≤ AB,
i.e. when the firm is in bankruptcy.
3.2 Level Dependent Annuities
In their second paper, Mjøs et al. (2008), the authors consider claims with payout de-
pending on the value of the underlying value process. This article is using the same setup
as the previous, i.e. the underlying value process is the same as derived in section 2.1.
Again, the infinite annuities in the case with bankruptcy risk will be set up. First,
the expressions for claims on a solvent firm will be shown. The value of an above annuity,
V aA , when A ≥ AB, is given by
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V aA =
λA
r − µ −
λAB
r − µ
[
α− 1
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β + 1
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α][
A
AL
]−β
. (3.7)
Here λ denotes the annuity payment rate. That is, the claim in equation (3.7) pays λA
as long as A ≥ AB.The value of an above annuity, V bA, when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
V bA =
λAB
r − µ
β + 1
α + β
[
A
AB
]α
− λAB
r − µ
β + 1
α + β
[
AL
AB
]α [
A
AL
]−β
. (3.8)
Similarly, the expressions for claims on a firm in bankruptcy can be set up as follows.
The value of a below annuity, V aB , when A ≥ AB, is given by
V aB =
λAB
r − µ
[
α− 1
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β + 1
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α
− AL
AB
] [
A
AL
]−β
. (3.9)
Here the value is gained from receiving λA as long as AL ≤ A ≤ AB. The value of a
below annuity, V bB, when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
V bB =
λA
r − µ −
λAB
r − µ
β + 1
α + β
[
A
AB
]α
− λAB
r − µ
[
AL
AB
− β + 1
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α] [
A
AL
]−β
. (3.10)
These expressions will be used for setting up the annuities in the new static capital
structure.
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4 Simple Approach to the New Model
This section will be used to build up a simple approach for the new model. The main
purpose of this section will be to show that, when allowing for the barrier for bankruptcy
to be set above the barrier for liquidation, value of equity is increased. This is shown by
checking the partial derivatives of equity with respect to the barrier for bankruptcy, AB,
and the barrier for liquidation, AL.
The framework of the new model, will be based on the same claims on the firm’s EBIT
stream as in Leland (1994). Therefore value of debt, bankruptcy costs, tax benefits, firm,
and equity needs to be re-derived using the results from Mjøs and Persson (2008). The
underlying value process is still the same as derived in section 2.1. This value process
will be denoted A in order to distinguish it from the V in Leland (1994).
4.1 Value of Debt
Let D(A) denote the value of debt in place. The debt promises a perpetual coupon
payment, c, as long as the firm is solvent, i.e. when A ≥ AB. Here the above annuity
from equations (3.3) and (3.4) can be used to model the coupon payments. Also, the
terminal value if the firm is liquidated, needs to be added. The terminal value must be
multiplied with the probability for liquidation, as in equation (3.1).
The value of debt, when A ≥ AB, is therefore given by
Da(A) =
c
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α)(
A
AL
)−β]
+ (1− λL)AL
[
A
AL
]−β
.
(4.1)
The value of debt, when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
Db(A) =
c
r
β
α + β
[(
A
AB
)α
−
(
AL
AB
)α(
A
AL
)−β]
+ (1− λL)AL
[
A
AL
]−β
,
(4.2)
where 0 ≤ λL ≤ 1 is the fractional loss in case of liquidation. D(A) is increasing in the
parameters c and A, and decreasing in the parameters r and λL, for fixed barriers AB
and AL. Here, the first term gives the value of receiving coupons as long as the firm is
solvent. The second term is the terminal value that the debt holders get if the firm is
liquidated.
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4.2 Value of Liquidation Costs
If the value of the firm reaches the absorbing barrier for liquidation, AL, some fraction
0 ≤ δL ≤ 1 of the firm value is lost in liquidation costs. This loss can be priced by using
equation (3.1). Hence, the value of liquidation costs is given by
BCL(A) = λLAL
[
A
AL
]−β
. (4.3)
BCL(A) is increasing in the parameter λL, and decreasing in the parameter A, for fixed
barrier AL.
4.3 Value of Tax Benefits
The value of the tax benefits is a fraction, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, of the coupons paid by the firm.
Since the firm only pays coupons when it is solvent, this value is found by using the above
annuity from equations (3.3) and (3.4). The value of tax benefits, when A ≥ AB, is given
by
TBa(A) =
τc
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α)(
A
AL
)−β]
. (4.4)
Similar, the value of tax benefits, when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
TBb(A) =
τc
r
β
α + β
[(
A
AB
)α
−
(
AL
AB
)α(
A
AL
)−β]
. (4.5)
TB(A) is increasing in the parameters τ , c, and A, and decreasing in the parameter r for
fixed barriers AB and AL.
4.4 Value of Firm
The total value of the firm, denoted v(A), can be found by adding up the external claims
to the firm. For this case, the firm consist of the EBIT stream, the tax benefits, and the
liquidation costs. Therefore, the value of the firm, when A ≥ AB, is given by
va(A) =A+ TBa(A)−BCL(A)
=A+
τc
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α)(
A
AL
)−β]
− λLAL
(
A
AL
)−β
.
(4.6)
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The value of the firm, when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
vb(A) =A+ TBb(A)−BCL(A)
=A+
τc
r
β
α + β
[(
A
AB
)α
−
(
AL
AB
)α(
A
AL
)−β]
− λLAL
(
A
AL
)−β
.
(4.7)
v(A) is increasing in the parameters A, τ , and c, and decreasing in the parameters r and
λL, for fixed barriers AB and AL.
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Figure 6: Value of the firm dependent on the barriers for bankruptcy, B, and
liquidation, L.
Figure 6 shows how the value of the firm increases as the barriers for bankruptcy and
liquidation goes towards zero. Hence, from the total value of the firm’s point of view,
allowing for early bankruptcy or liquidation is not optimal. The values of the parameters
are the same as in section 2.8.
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4.5 Value of Equity
According to the absolute priority rule, the equity holders have the residual claim to the
firm’s EBIT stream. In order to calculate the value of equity, value of debt is subtracted
from the value of the firm. Hence, the value of equity, when A ≥ AB, is given by
Ea(A) =va(A)−Da(A)
=A− (1− τ)c
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
AL
AB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
AL
AB
)α)(
A
AL
)−β]
− AL
(
A
AL
)−β
.
(4.8)
Similar, the value of equity, when AL ≤ A ≤ AB, is given by
Eb(A) =vb(A)−Db(A)
=A− (1− τ)c
r
β
α + β
[(
A
AB
)α
−
(
AL
AB
)α(
A
AL
)−β]
− AL
(
A
AL
)−β
.
(4.9)
E(A) is increasing in the parameters A, r, and τ , and decreasing in the parameter c.
From E(A), the cash flows to the equity holders can be identified. The first term is
their claim to the firm’s EBIT stream, the second term is the after tax deducted coupon
payments, and the third term is the loss of the entire firm at liquidation.
4.6 Endogenous Liquidation Barrier
If the equity holders are able to set the barrier for liquidation, they will maximize the
value of equity with respect to the barrier, AL. By using the smooth pasting condition, it
is required that the derivative of the process starting above AB is equal to the derivative
of the process starting below AB. These derivatives are given by
∂Ea(A)
∂AL
=
(1− τ)c
r
βA−βA−αB A
α+β−1
L − (β + 1)A−βAβL, (4.10)
and
∂Eb(A)
∂AL
=
(1− τ)c
r
βA−βA−αB A
α+β−1
L − (β + 1)A−βAβL. (4.11)
From equations (4.10) and (4.11), it is shown that these derivatives will be equal for any
value of AL. Hence, value of equity can be maximized by setting one of these derivatives
equal to zero, and solving for AL.
21
∂Ea(A)
∂AL
= 0
(1− τ)c
r
βA−βA−αB A
α+β−1
L − (β + 1)A−βAβL = 0.
(4.12)
This equation has two possible solutions.
Either AL = 0, or
AL =
[
(1− τ)c
r
β
β + 1
] 1
1−α
A
α
α−1
B .
(4.13)
Here, equity holders might not want to liquidate the firm as long as it has positive
value. The reason for this is, that when the firm is in bankruptcy, equity holders pay no
coupons. In other word, the only possible cost is the liquidation cost. This is minimized
by setting the barrier for liquidation equal to zero.
4.7 Endogenous Bankruptcy Barrier
If the equity holders are able to set the barrier for bankruptcy, they will maximize the
value of equity with respect to the barrier, AB. By using the smooth pasting condition, it
is required that the derivative of the process starting above AB is equal to the derivative
of the process starting below AB. These derivatives are given by
∂Ea(A)
∂AB
=
(1− τ)c
r
αβ
α + β
A−βAβ−1B −
(1− τ)c
r
αβ
α + β
A−βAα+βL A
−α−1
B , (4.14)
and
∂Eb(A)
∂AB
= −(1− τ)c
r
αβ
α + β
A−βAα+βL A
−α−1
B +
(1− τ)c
r
αβ
α + β
AαA−α−1B . (4.15)
These equations satisfy the smooth pasting condition, only when
Either AB = A, or
AB = 0.
(4.16)
Here, equity holders will either go bankrupt straight away, or wait until the value of
the EBIT stream is equal to zero.
Figure 7 illustrates how the value of the equity changes with changing barriers for
bankruptcy and liquidation. It is evident that equity is maximized when AB is set as
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Figure 7: The value of equity dependent on the barriers for bankruptcy, B, and
liquidation, L.
high as possible, and AL is set as low as possible. Hence, from equations (4.13) and
(4.16), AL = 0 and AB = A will be the final solutions to this maximization problem.
The main reason for this extreme solution is that equity holders are offered a free
lunch. They can choose to go straight into bankruptcy without taking any costs. In
bankruptcy they do not pay any coupons, so as long as there is debt in place, bankruptcy
at once will always be most beneficial in this setup.
4.8 Comparative Statics
Here, a new numerical example will be presented, in order to compare the new results
from those in section 2.8.
The parameters will again be set to the values; µ = 3.5%, σ = 20%, r = 6%, λ = 50%,
τ = 35%, c = 6, and A = 100.
Now it is necessary to check whether this multi barrier approach can add value to the
firm, and/or to the equity in the firm.
Figure 8 is based on non-optimal barriers. The barrier for liquidation is set to the
bankruptcy barrier in Leland (1994). The barrier for bankruptcy is set 20% above the
barrier for liquidation. The value of the firm remains almost constant as the the model
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Figure 8: Differences between the two models based on Leland (1994) barrier.
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Figure 9: Differences between the two models based on optimal barriers.
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change. The slight loss in the new model is due to losing some tax deductions when the
firm is in bankruptcy. For the value of debt and for the value of equity the difference is
obvious. The main reason for this is that since the coupon is not paid within bankruptcy,
this obviously is beneficial for the value of equity. Hence, the value of equity is higher,
and the value of debt is lower than in the Leland (1994) model.
Figure 9 is based on the optimal barriers, found from figure 7. The values of debt,
firm, and equity, are linear in the coupon. It is obvious that from the equity holders point
of view, there is possibly a large gain from using this new multi barrier model. From the
debt holders or the total value of the firm’s point of view, there is only a gain when the
coupon is high, compared to the modified Leland (1994) solution.
Using the economical framework set up in section 3 and 4 illustrates that, when
allowing for bankruptcy and liquidation to happen at different levels, equity will have a
higher value. Also, for highly levered firms, there might be a higher value of the firm in
total. The next section will be used to extend the model presented here. The key issue
will be to set the bankruptcy procedure in such a way that the goals of a bankruptcy
procedure identified in Hart (2000) are satisfied.
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5 New Static Capital Structure Model In Presence
of Bankruptcy And Liquidation
In this section, the new static capital structure model will be presented. This model will
be based on the model developed in section 4. In order to make the bankruptcy procedure
efficient, goals identified by Hart (2000) will be used. First, a good bankruptcy procedure
should deliver an ex post efficient outcome. Second, a good bankruptcy procedure should
preserve the bonding role of debt by penalizing managers and share holders adequately
in bankruptcy states. Third, a good bankruptcy procedure should preserve the absolute
priority of claims, except that some portion of value should possibly be reserved for share
holders.
The underlying value process presented in section 2.1 will now be slightly modified.
Instead of using V , the equation (2.2) will be used to modify all the equations in section
2.1. The annuities provided by Mjøs and Persson (2008) and Mjøs et al. (2008) can be
used without any modification, except for a pure notational change from A to δ. Hence,
the underlying value will now be the EBIT stream itself, denoted δ. The expressions for
α and β will also remain unchanged.
5.1 Value of Debt
Let D(δ) denote the value of debt in place. The creditors are promised a perpetual
coupon payment, c, as long as the firm is solvent. They will receive the firm’s EBIT if
the firm is in bankruptcy, and the liquidation value if the firm is liquidated. If the firm
is able to get out of bankruptcy and regain solvency, the creditors will grant the debtor
a cash payment. This cash payment will be referred to as debt forgiveness. The received
EBIT’s are present due to the second goal identified in Hart (2000). The debt forgiveness
will model the third goal. Let δB denote the level of the EBIT when the firm declares
bankruptcy.
Let δL denote the level of the EBIT when the firm i liquidated. In order to set up
the expression for the value of debt, we now have four cash flows to identify. First, the
coupons, will be an above annuity, as in equations (3.3) and (3.4). These expressions will
now be
Couponsa =
c
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α)(
δ
δL
)−β]
, (5.1)
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and
Couponsb =
c
r
β
α + β
[(
δ
δB
)α
−
(
δL
δB
)α(
δ
δL
)−β]
. (5.2)
Second, the EBIT’s received, when δL ≤ δ ≤ δB, is a below annuity, as in equations
(3.9) and (3.10). Here, the annuity payment rate will be set to 1. These expressions are
EBITa =
δB
r − µ
[
α− 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β + 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α
− δL
δB
] [
δ
δL
]−β
, (5.3)
and
EBITb =
δ
r − µ −
δB
r − µ
β + 1
α + β
[
δ
δB
]α
− δB
r − µ
[
δL
δB
− β + 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α] [
δ
δL
]−β
. (5.4)
Third, the liquidation value will be
Liq = (1− λL) δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
, (5.5)
where 0 ≤ λL ≤ 1 is the fractional liquidation cost.
Finally, fourth, the debt forgiveness, DF, will be modeled as a fraction of the coupons
paid to the equity holders, if the firm is in bankruptcy and regains solvency. Hence,
equations (3.1) and (3.2) will be used to price this claim. The expressions will be
DFa = λB
[
δ
δB
]α [
δ
δB
]−β
Couponsa (5.6)
and
DFb = λB
[
δ
δB
]α
Couponsb, (5.7)
where 0 ≤ λB ≤ 1 is the fractional forgiveness parameter.
Adding up equations (5.1), (5.3), (5.5), and (5.6), the value of debt, when δ ≥ δB, is
given by
Da(δ) =Couponsa + EBITa + Liq−DFa
=
[
1− λB
[
δ
δB
]α [
δ
δB
]−β]
c
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α)(
δ
δL
)−β]
+
δB
r − µ
[
α− 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β + 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α
− δL
δB
] [
δ
δL
]−β
+ (1− λL) δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
.
(5.8)
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Similarly, equations (5.2), (5.4), (5.5), and (5.7) adds up to the value of debt, when
δL ≤ δ ≤ δB. This is given by
Db(δ) =Couponsb + EBITb + Liq−DFb
=
[
1− λB
[
δ
δB
]α]
c
r
β
α + β
[(
δ
δB
)α
−
(
δL
δB
)α(
δ
δL
)−β]
+
δ
r − µ −
δB
r − µ
β + 1
α + β
[
δ
δB
]α
− δB
r − µ
[
δL
δB
− β + 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α] [
δ
δL
]−β
+ (1− λL) δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
.
(5.9)
5.2 Value of Liquidation Costs
If the value of the EBITs hit the absorbing barrier for liquidation, δL, some liquidation
costs will occur. The value of these costs can be modeled as the bankruptcy costs in
section 2.3. Hence, the value of liquidation costs, BCL, is given by
BCL(δ) = λL
δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
. (5.10)
BCL(δ) is increasing in the parameters λL, δL, and µ, and decreasing in the parameters
r and δ. These costs only occur if the firm is liquidated.
5.3 Value of Tax Benefits
When a firm pays coupons on its debt, it is tax deductible. In other words, the firm will
receive an amount equal to the tax rate times the coupon paid. Since the firm only pay
coupons when it is solvent, it is again necessary to use the above annuity from equations
(3.3) and (3.4) in order to calculate the value of these tax benefits.
The value of tax benefits, when δ ≥ δB, is therefore given by
TBa(δ) =
τc
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α)(
δ
δL
)−β]
. (5.11)
Similar, when δL ≤ δ ≤ δB, the value of tax benefits is given by
TBb(δ) =
τc
r
β
α + β
[(
δ
δB
)α
−
(
δL
δB
)α(
δ
δL
)−β]
. (5.12)
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TB(δ) is increasing in the parameters τ , c, and δ, and decreasing in the parameters r,
δB, and δL. As mentioned in section 2, the firm might not be in a taxable situation. This
situation is not taken into consideration for this model.
5.4 Value of Firm
The total value of the firm, denoted v(δ), is given by three different cash flows in the
firm. The EBIT stream, tax benefits, and liquidation costs.
The value of the firm, when δ ≥ δB, is therefore found by adding up equations
(2.2),(5.11), and (5.10).
va(δ) =
δ
r − µ + TB
a(δ)−BCL(δ)
=
δ
r − µ +
τc
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α)(
δ
δL
)−β]
− λL δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
.
(5.13)
Similarly, the value of the firm, when δL ≤ δ ≤ δB, is found by adding up equations (2.2),
(5.12), and (5.10).
vb(δ) =
δ
r − µ + TB
b(δ)−BCL(δ)
=
δ
r − µ +
τc
r
β
α + β
[(
δ
δB
)α
−
(
δL
δB
)α(
δ
δL
)−β]
− λL δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
.
(5.14)
v(δ) is increasing in the parameters δ, µ, τ , and c, and decreasing in the parameters r,
λL, δB, and δL.
Figure 10 illustrates the effect the barriers have on the value of the firm. It is obvious
that the value of the firm is maximized if the values of these barriers are equal to zero.
The reason for this, is that with early bankruptcy, some tax benefits are lost, and with
early liquidation, liquidation costs will occur.
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Figure 10: The value of the firm dependent on the barriers for bankruptcy, B, and
liquidation, L.
5.5 Value of Equity
The value of equity, denoted E(δ), is the residual claim on the firm’s cash flow. This
value can be found by subtracting the value of debt from the value of the firm. Hence,
the value of equity, when δ ≥ δB, is given by
Ea(δ) =va(δ)−Da(δ)
=
δ
r − µ +
(1− τ)c
r
[(
α
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α)(
δ
δL
)−β
− 1
]
− δB
r − µ
[
α− 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β + 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α
− δL
δB
][
δ
δL
]−β
+ λB
[
δ
δB
]α [
δ
δB
]−β
c
r
[
1−
(
α
α + β
(
δL
δB
)−β
+
β
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α)(
δ
δL
)−β]
− δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
.
(5.15)
Similar, when δL ≤ δ ≤ δB, the value of equity is given by
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Eb(δ) =vb(δ)−Db(δ)
=
δ
r − µ +
(1− τ)c
r
β
α + β
[(
δL
δB
)α(
δ
δL
)−β
−
(
δ
δB
)α]
− δ
r − µ +
δB
r − µ
β + 1
α + β
[
δ
δB
]α
+
δB
r − µ
[
δL
δB
− β + 1
α + β
(
δL
δB
)α] [
δ
δL
]−β
+ λB
[
δ
δB
]α
c
r
β
α + β
[(
δ
δB
)α
−
(
δL
δB
)α(
δ
δL
)−β]
− δL
r − µ
[
δ
δL
]−β
.
(5.16)
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Figure 11: The value of the equity dependent on the barriers for bankruptcy, B,
and liquidation, L.
Figure 11 illustrate how the value of equity changes with the barriers for bankruptcy
and liquidation. The equity holders in the firm have two options. Either to pay the
coupon, or not to pay the coupon. The moment they choose not to pay the coupon
triggers bankruptcy. In other words, equity holders are not able to set the liquidation
barrier. From the figure we see that equity is maximized when liquidation barrier is
equal to zero and the firm goes straight into bankruptcy. However, this is not a plausible
outcome. The reason for that is that the creditors have the right to liquidate a firm in
chapter 11 after a grace period. The conditions for this grace period can be a given time
period that the firm is given to solve their credit issues. Since these thesis is based on
perpetual claims, the grace period will be set such that the liquidation barrier is 75% of
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the barrier for bankruptcy. This will give the firm some time to resolve their credit issue,
and be able to regain solvency.
5.6 Endogenous Bankruptcy Barrier
The equity holders are able to set the bankruptcy barrier by choosing when to stop paying
coupons. To find the optimal level for this barrier, we can maximize the value of equity
with respect to the barrier, δB and setting the derivative equal to zero. This gives
∂Ea(δ)
∂δB
= 0
(1− τ)c
r
αβ
α + β
δ−β
[
δβ−1B − δα+βL δ−α−1B
]
+
1
r − µ
(α− 1)(β + 1)
α + β
δ−β
[
δα+βL δ
−α
B − δβB
]
+
λBc
r
(β − α)δα−βδβ−α−1B −
λBc
r
α(2β − α)
α + β
δα−2βδ2β−α−1B
−λBc
r
β(β − 2α)
α + β
δα−2βδα+βL δ
β−2α−1
B = 0.
(5.17)
This expression can be solved numerically for given liquidation barriers. The liquidation
barrier is set by the regulations within chapter 11. For the purpose of this model, the
barrier for liquidation will be contracted between the creditor and debtor to be 75% of the
barrier for bankruptcy. This will allow for the equity to renegotiate their debt, illustrated
by the debt forgiveness parameter, and regain solvency.
5.7 Comparative Statics
Using a numerical example of this model, it can be compared to the results from the
modified Leland (1994) in section 2.8. The parameters will again be set to the values;
µ = 3.5%, σ = 20%, r = 6%, λ = 50%, τ = 35%, c = 6, and δ = 2.5 which is equivalent
to V = 100. Also, as previously mentioned, the δL = 0.75δB.
Figure 12 shows how the values of debt, liquidation costs, tax benefits, firm, and
equity changes when the coupon changes. The values of debt, tax benefits, and firm are
concave in the coupon, while the values of liquidation costs and equity are convex in the
coupon. It order to understand these values better, some of the values will be studied
more thoroughly, starting of with the value of the firm.
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Figure 12: The effect of coupons on the various claims.
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Figure 13: The effect of volatility on the value of the firm.
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5.7.1 Value of the Firm
Figure 13 shows how the effect of volatility on the value of the firm. Contrary to Leland
(1994), where a low volatility gave the highest value of the firm, the medium volatility
gives the highest value. It is clear that the volatility parameter effects the curvature of the
plots in both directions. First the curvature flattens, going from 15% to 20% volatility,
then it sharpens, going from 20% to 25% volatility. A highly volatile firm optimally puts
on coupons of 5, a mid volatile firm optimally puts on coupons of 6.5 and a lowly volatile
firm optimally puts on coupons of 5.5. Leland (1994) finds optimal coupons in the range
from 6.5 to 7 for all volatilities. From this one can conclude that a firm in the new model
is likely to put on less coupons when levering the firm, compared to the solutions provided
by Leland (1994).
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Figure 14: The effect of the liquidation barrier on the value of the firm.
Figure 14 illustrates the effect on the value of the firm allowing for the liquidation
barrier to be set at different fractions of the bankruptcy barrier. The mid fraction for
liquidation gives the highest value of the firm. Intuitively, it does not make sense that
the firm in total will be worth less when the liquidation barrier is set at a lower fraction.
However, the reason for this result is that the barriers are set maximizing the value of
equity.
Figure 15 illustrates the effect on the value of the firm when the debt forgiveness
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Figure 15: The effect of debt forgiveness on the value of the firm.
factor is changed. Again the results are rather puzzling. Increasing the debt forgiveness
parameter from 10% to 15% reduces the value of the firm significantly. The main reason
for this is that the equity holders will have good incentives to enter bankruptcy in order
to try to regain solvency and get this debt forgiveness. Early bankruptcy results in less
tax benefits for the firm. Also worth noticing, is the fact that with high debt forgiveness
factor, the firm optimally puts on coupons of only 4.
Figure 16 shows how the value of the firm changes as the leverage changes. Leverage
is again calculated by dividing the value of debt by the value of the firm. A high volatile
firm is optimally levered at about 45% while the other two illustrated volatilities are
optimally levered at about 60-65%. Leland (1994) gives optimal leverage in the range
of 70-80% for these volatilities. Hence, for this model, the firm is optimally levered at a
lower level.
5.7.2 Value of Equity
Figure 17 shows how the value of equity changes as the coupon changes. Value of equity
is decreasing in the coupons, but at a slower pace than in Leland (1994). As equity, in
the presence of debt, is an option like instrument, it should be obvious that the value of
equity increases with the volatility of the firm’s EBIT stream. This is specially shown
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Figure 16: The effect of volatility on the leverage in the firm.
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Figure 17: The effect of volatility on the value of equity.
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when going to the high volatility, where this curve is much flatter than the other two.
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Figure 18: The effect of the liquidation barrier on the value of equity.
Figure 18 shows the effect of changing the gap between the liquidation barrier and
the bankruptcy barrier. Going from the base example, i.e. 75%, to 90% does not make
much difference for the value of equity. Contrary extending the gap, where liquidation
happens at 60% of the lever for bankruptcy, value of equity is increasing significantly.
Figure 19 illustrates the effect of the debt forgiveness parameter. The debt forgiveness
is a direct transfer between debt and equity. The observed effect is as expected. Higher
λB increases the value of equity, and lower λB decreases the value of equity.
5.7.3 Barrier for Bankruptcy
Figure 20 shows how the effect of volatility on the bankruptcy barrier. Lower volatility
results in earlier bankruptcy than for the base example. For the higher volatility the
effect is mixed. Here we get later bankruptcy at low coupons and earlier bankruptcy at
high coupons. The main reason for this is probably that the debt forgiveness gets more
lucrative and the firm is willing to go into bankruptcy just to bounce out again due to
the high volatility. Comparing to the bankruptcy/liquidation barrier in Leland (1994),
bankruptcy happens at a earlier stage.
37
020
40
60
80
100
0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 12.00
Coupons
V
a
lu
e
 o
f 
E
q
u
it
y
DF 5%
DF 10%
DF 15%
Figure 19: The effect of debt forgiveness on the value of equity.
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Figure 20: The effect of volatility on the bankruptcy barrier.
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Figure 21: The effect of the liquidation barrier on the bankruptcy barrier.
Figure 21 illustrates the effect of changing the gap between the two barriers. Ex-
tending the gap results in earlier bankruptcy, and shortening the gap results in later
bankruptcy. An intuitive explanation of this is result is that a small gap increases the
probability of liquidation. Hence, the equity holders are not willing to try to get the
debt forgiveness by deliberately going into bankruptcy just to get out again as soon as
possible.
Figure 22 illustrates the effect of the debt forgiveness factor on the bankruptcy barrier.
Making the debt forgiveness larger, i.e. increasing λB, makes again the bankruptcy state
more attractive. The reason that there is almost no effect of going from 5% to 10% is
that in the bankruptcy state, the equity holders looses both their EBIT stream and the
tax benefits. Therefore the debt forgiveness must be larger than the losses in order to
attract equity holders to go for the debt forgiveness.
5.7.4 Leland (1994)
Concluding this section, some comparison to the Leland (1994) should be done. Figures
23 and 24 illustrates the differences between the new model and Leland (1994) for mid
and high volatility. The effect of high versus mid or low volatility on the firm’s capital
structure is completely opposite for the two models. Going from mid to high volatility
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Figure 22: The effect of debt forgiveness on the bankruptcy barrier.
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Figure 23: Differences between Leland (1994) and the new model. Volatility at
20%
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Figure 24: Differences between Leland (1994) and the new model. Volatility at
25%.
increases the amount of debt in the Leland (1994) model. On the contrary, in the new
model this reduces the amount of debt added to the firm’s capital structure. The exact
same effect is observed for the value of debt. For the value of equity, the effect of going
from mid to high volatility is the same for both models. But the value of equity is a bit
higher in the new model compared to Leland (1994).
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6 Conclusions
This thesis has focused on using the framework provided in Broadie et al. (2007) to extend
the Leland (1994) model. Doing so, valuations of claims on the firm’s cash flow have been
set according to annuities set forth in Mjøs and Persson (2008) and Mjøs et al. (2008).
The bankruptcy procedure has been set according to the goals identified in Hart (2000).
The new static model for capital structure is based on equity holders choosing when
to enter bankruptcy by stopping to pay coupons. The creditors have been locked by a
contract, so they can not choose when they want the firm liquidated. This is similar to
the grace period used in Broadie et al. (2007). A interesting study would be to check if
there exists an equilibrium, where liquidation is below bankruptcy, if the creditors are
given the right to liquidate the firm whenever the firm is in bankruptcy.
The results provided by the new model gives useful insights to how different param-
eters effect the firm’s capital structure and the barriers for bankruptcy and liquidation.
Compared to the benchmark model, some parameters behave similar, while other gives
effects that are very different between the models. Comparing the actual outcomes, the
new model transfer value from the creditors to the equity holders without changing the
total value of the firm substantially. In other words, optimal level of leverage is reduced
towards levels that can be found empirically.
There are some limitations to the model. First of all, it is a static model. That means
that the capital structure in the firm is never re-optimized. The firm is levered once,
and then leverage moves as the value of the EBIT’s move. Second, it does not take into
account whether the firm actually is in a taxable position or not. Tax benefits are treated
as a payout from the government. Third, the first goal identified by Hart (2000) might
not be satisfied. As long as the firm is liquidated when A ≥ 0, the bankruptcy procedure
may not be ex post efficient. However, this can be solved by selling the firm as a going
firm and not selling off the individual assets in the firm.
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